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Kevin L. Kliesen
gas prices and highlights recent trends in natural
gas usage at both the industry and national levels.
The article concludes with some empirical find-
ings that generally suggest that rising natural gas
prices predict growth in only a handful of manu-
facturing industries. Perhaps surprisingly, higher
natural gas prices do not predict slower growth
for the three industries where expenditures on
natural gas are a relatively large share of total
industry shipments: primary metals, nonmetallic
mineral products, and chemicals. In terms of the
aggregate economy, increases in crude oil prices
significantly predict the growth of real gross
domestic product (GDP), but increases in natural
gas prices do not.
TRENDS IN NATURAL GAS PRICES
From 1954 to 1978, the price of natural gas
transported through the interstate pipeline system
was regulated by the Federal Power Commission.
Under this system, price-setting was based on pro-
B
eginning in early 2002, prices of crude
oil and natural gas began to trend
upward. By September 2005, as the
damage to the production, refining,
and distribution facilities in the Gulf Coast by
hurricanes Katrina and Rita became clearer,
natural gas prices rose to record-high levels in
both nominal and real dollar terms. Although
crude oil prices rose to a record-high level in
nominal terms, they remained below the record-
high levels in real terms seen in early 1981. Pre-
vious research has shown that sharply higher oil
prices have preceded all but one of the post-
World War II recessions. However, less is known
about the relationship between rising natural gas
prices and macroeconomic activity, despite the
fact that many manufacturing industries and,
increasingly, electric utilities are heavy con-
sumers of natural gas. Accordingly, one might
reasonably assume that record-high levels of
natural gas prices might have significant adverse
consequences for U.S. macroeconomic activity. 
This article examines developments in natural
In the aftermath of the disruptions caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita, natural gas prices rose
to record-high levels. Because natural gas is an important energy source for the U.S. economy,
there was widespread concern that these high prices might cause a significant slowing in the
economy—especially among those manufacturing industries that heavily consume natural gas.
The analysis presented in this article suggests that output is responsive to natural gas prices in
some manufacturing sectors. Although perhaps significant, this result must be balanced against
the finding that, when the analysis is extended to the macroeconomy (real gross domestic product
growth), increases in crude oil prices significantly predict real gross domestic product growth, but
natural gas prices do not. (JEL Q41, Q43)
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           duction costs and applications for rate increases
moved slowly through the bureaucratic process.1
As a result, prices changed very little from year
to year. As seen in Figure 1, from 1949 to 1978,
wellhead prices averaged $0.21 per thousand
cubic feet (mcf), with an annual standard deviation
of $0.20 per mcf.2 Although phased deregulation
began with the passage of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, prices began to rise in the mid-1970s,
a period of turmoil in international energy mar-
kets that saw a sharp increase in crude oil prices.
Eventually, natural gas prices peaked in 1984 at
$2.66 per mcf (nominal). Prices subsequently
retreated modestly and then remained fairly stable
for several years: From 1986 to 1999, natural gas
prices averaged $1.87 per mcf, with a standard
deviation of $0.24 per year. Following the 2001
recession, natural gas prices began to rise notice-
ably. By 2004, gas prices in both real and nominal
dollars were at record-high levels. 
In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made
landfall near New Orleans, Louisiana, and then
about one month later, Hurricane Rita made land-
fall near the Texas-Louisiana border. These two
hurricanes caused significant damage to the Gulf
Coast’s production, refining, and distribution
facilities. In response, natural gas prices surged.
Over the first seven months of 2005, natural gas
prices at the wellhead averaged $6.06 per mcf.
By August 30, a day after Katrina’s landfall, prices
in the spot market, which typically include a
premium above the wellhead price, had surged
pass $12 per million British thermal units (BTU),
and by September 22, 2005, the day before Rita’s
landfall, the spot price had risen to $15.00 per
million BTU.3 Over the final four months of the
year, with a significant percentage of natural gas
production in the Gulf still shut-in, the wellhead
price averaged approximately $10 per mcf. 
Viewed from a slightly longer-term perspec-
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1 Yang (1977) and Ott and Tatom (1982b) discuss the history of
natural gas regulation and deregulation.
2 The wellhead price is that received at the point of production
(when the gas reaches the surface). According to the EIA, this price
is calculated by dividing the total reported value at the wellhead
by the total quantity produced. The latter is the amount reported
by the appropriate agencies of individual producing states and the
U.S. Mineral Management Service. The wellhead price includes
all costs prior to shipment from the lease, including gathering and
compression costs, in addition to state production, severance, and
similar charges. See the glossary in the U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s Annual Energy Review 2004 (2005); e.g., “mcf”
indicates one thousand cubic feet and one cubic foot is equal to
1,031 BTU; www.eia.doe.gov/kids/energyfacts/science/
energy_calculator.html#natgascalc.














Natural Gas Prices at the Wellhead
SOURCE: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
3 In anticipation of Hurricane Rita’s landfall, natural gas shipments
to the Henry Hub, Louisiana, delivery point were suspended on
September 23. Deliveries resumed on October 7. One thousand
cubic feet of natural gas is approximately equal to 1 million BTU.tive, the hurricanes exacerbated recent trends in
higher natural gas prices. In their August 9, 2005,
Short-Term Energy Outlook (pre-Katrina), the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) noted
several factors that were expected to keep natural
gas prices at high levels over the near term:
The natural gas market is likely to stay tight
over the next couple of months, with prices
projected to rise further as the winter heating
season increases demand. Although natural
gas storage remains above the 5-year average,
several factors are expected to continue to sup-
port high natural gas prices, including: high
world oil prices; continued strength in the
economy; the expectation that Pacific North-
west hydroelectric resources will be below
normal through the rest of the year; limited
prospects for growth in domestic natural gas
production; and concerns about the potential
effects of hurricanes. 
U.S. NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION
Rising natural gas prices are a concern in the
macroeconomy because many industrial and
utility sectors are intensive users of natural gas
and most households rely on gas to heat their
homes during the winter months. In late 2005,
anecdotal reports from the manufacturing sector
suggested that high energy prices had indeed
raised input costs and precipitated price sur-
charges among some industries. Examples of this
nature were regularly cited in the Institute for
Supply Management Report on Business for the
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors
and in the Federal Reserve’s “Beige Book.” The
purpose of this section is to quantify natural gas
usage in the U.S. economy—both in comparison
with other sources of energy and usage by sector.
Petroleum products remain the largest
source of energy for the U.S. economy. As seen
in Figure 2, 40.2 percent of U.S. energy consump-
tion in 2004 (based on BTU) was derived from
petroleum products such as oil, gasoline, and
diesel fuel. Energy consumption derived from
natural gas was the next largest source (23.1
percent), followed closely by coal (22.5 percent).
The percentage of energy derived from natural
gas consumption has been falling since 1971,
when it peaked at nearly 32.4 percent of total
BTU. By 1986, the percentage of total energy from
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Energy Consumption by Major Source
SOURCE: U.S. Energy Information Administration.natural gas had fallen to just under 22 percent;
however, it has since stabilized. Consumption of
nuclear energy and conventional hydroelectric
power sources are significantly smaller, both less
than 10 percent of the total.
Table 1 details natural gas consumption in
the economy by the four major end-use sectors
(residential, commercial, industrial, and trans-
portation) and by the electrical power–generating
sector. Traditionally, the industrial sector has been
a heavy consumer of natural gas.4 For instance,
in 1950 it accounted for nearly 60 percent of total
natural gas consumption.5 The next highest end-
user was the residential sector (20.8 percent),
followed by the commercial (6.7 percent) and
transportation (2.2 percent) sectors. (See Table 1
for sector descriptions and definitions.) Over time,
there has been a shift in usage shares away from
the industrial sector toward the commercial and
electrical power generation sectors. In 1950, the
electric power sector accounted for about 11
percent of natural gas consumption, while the
commercial sector consumed a little less than 7
percent. Since then the shares of the commercial
and electrical-generation sectors have doubled,
while there has been relatively little change in the
share of natural gas consumed by the residential
and transportation sectors. Although industrial
usage still accounts for the largest share of total
consumption in 2004, its share has declined by
more than a third. 
One of the purposes of this article is to assess
whether changes in natural gas prices help to
predict changes in the growth of manufacturing
and aggregate output and whether changes in gas
prices matter more than changes in crude oil
prices. This is difficult to accomplish because
energy consumption by industry is not available
on a timely basis. However, the EIA periodically
surveys manufacturers about their energy use.
This is known as the Manufacturing Energy
Consumption Survey (MECS). 
According to the 2002 (latest) MECS, six
industries accounted for a little more than 83
percent, or 5,400 trillion BTU, of the roughly
6,500 trillion BTU of natural gas consumed by
manufacturers in 2002: chemicals, petroleum and
coal products, primary metals, food, paper, and
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4 Consumption by establishments engaged primarily in processing
unfinished materials into another form of product; this includes
mining, petroleum refining manufacturing, and, beginning in 1996,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing.
5 Excluding the electric power sector (the “end-use” sectors),
industrial consumption usage was nearly 67 percent of all end-usage
in 1950. By 2004, its end-usage share had dropped to 49.5 percent.
Table 1
Natural Gas Consumption by Sector
End-use sectors (% of total)
Residential* Commercial† Industrial‡ Transportation§ Total end use Electrical power¶
1950 20.8 6.7 59.4 2.2 89.1 10.9
1960 25.9 8.5 48.2 2.9 85.6 14.4
1970 22.9 11.3 43.8 3.4 81.4 18.6
1980 23.9 13.1 41.2 3.2 81.5 18.5
1990 22.9 13.7 43.1 3.4 83.1 16.9
2000 21.4 13.6 39.8 2.8 77.7 22.3
2004 21.9 13.4 37.7 3.1 76.0 24.0
NOTE: *Consumption by private households. †Consumption by nonmanufacturing establishments. ‡Consumption by establishments
engaged primarily in processing unfinished materials into another form of product; this includes mining, petroleum refining manu-
facturing, and (beginning in 1996) agriculture, forestry, and fishing. §Natural gas transmission (pipeline) fuel and natural gas delivered
for use as vehicle fuel. ¶Electric utilities and independent power producers.
SOURCE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, 2004 (2005).nonmetallic mineral products (see Table 2). The
chemical industry consumed the most natural gas
(2,307 trillion), accounting for about 36 percent
of the total manufacturing BTU usage. The next
largest user, petroleum and coal products, used
about a third as much natural gas as the chemical
industry. In terms of their relative importance,
these industries accounted for about 30 percent
of total industrial production in 2005. Table 2 also
shows that there are four industries that derive
at least 50 percent of their energy demand from
natural gas: leather and allied products, fabricated
metal products, apparel, and food. However,
these four gas-intensive industries combined
Kliesen
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Table 2
Percentage of BTU Usage in the Manufacturing Sector Derived from Natural Gas (in trillion BTU)
Importance in 
Gas BTU  industrial 
NAICS code Subsector and industry Total* Natural gas† as a % of total production‡
311 Food 1,123 582 51.83 8.32
312 Beverage and tobacco products 105 46 43.81 2.64
313 Textile mills 207 75 36.23 0.62
314 Textile product mills 60 29 48.33 0.52
315 Apparel 30 16 53.33 0.68
316 Leather and allied products 7 4 57.14 0.11
321 Wood products 377 57 15.12 1.58
322 Paper products 2,363 504 21.33 2.77
323 Printing and related support 98 46 46.94 2.09
324 Petroleum and coal products 6,799 878 12.91 2.22
325 Chemicals 6,465 2,307 35.68 10.38
326 Plastics and rubber products 351 128 36.47 3.62
327 Nonmetallic mineral products 1,059 422 39.85 2.27
331 Primary metals 2,120 704 33.21 2.50
332 Fabricated metal products 388 210 54.12 5.76
333 Machinery 177 82 46.33 5.40
334 Computer and electronic  201 65 32.34 8.25
products
335 Electrical equipment, appliances,  172 53 30.81 2.12
and components
336 Transportation equipment 429 203 47.32 10.91
337 Furniture and related products 64 25 39.06 1.69
339 Miscellaneous manufacturing 71 32 45.07 3.24
Total 22,666 6,468 28.54 77.71
NOTE: *”Total” is the sum of all of the listed energy sources, including “miscellaneous manufacturing,” minus the shipments of energy
sources produced onsite. It is the total amount of first use of energy for all (fuel and nonfuel) purposes. †”Natural gas” includes natural
gas obtained from utilities, local distribution companies, and any other suppliers, such as independent gas producers, gas brokers,
marketers, and any marketing subsidiaries of utilities. ‡Relative importance estimates the contribution of the industry to the growth
of total industrial production in the following year.
SOURCE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002 Energy Consumption by Manufacturers (Table 1.2) (www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
mecs/mecs2002/data02/shelltables.html) and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (industrial production data).account for a much smaller share of industrial
production, about 15 percent.
Table 3 provides an alternative method of
measuring the intensity of natural gas usage.
This table shows the dollar value of the industry’s
total expenditures on natural gas as a percent of
its total shipments in the 2002 and 1998 MECS
years. Recall from Table 2 that the three most
gas-intensive industries were leather and allied
products, fabricated metal products, and apparel.
Each of these three industries relies on natural
gas for more than 50 percent of its total BTU usage.
As shown in Table 3, though, the three most gas-
intensive industries in 2002 were primary metals,
nonmetallic mineral products, and chemicals. The
paper and petroleum and coal products industries
were the only other industries where expendi-
tures were more than 1 percent of total industry
shipments in 2002. Compared with 1998, expendi-
tures on natural gas as a share of shipments for
all industries rose from about 0.5 percent to 0.6
percent, even though the nominal price of natural
gas rose by slightly more than 50 percent. Still,
as a percent of total shipments, expenditures on
natural gas are fairly small for all manufacturing
industries. 
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Table 3
Natural Gas Expenditures as a Percent of Manufacturing Shipments, 1998 and 2002
NAICS code Manufacturing industry 2002 share 1998 share
311 Food 0.55 0.39
312 Beverage and tobacco products 0.19 0.14
313 Textile mills 0.76 0.59
314 Textile product mills 0.40 0.28
315 Apparel 0.19 0.13
316 Leather and allied products 0.30 0.16
321 Wood products 0.31 0.24
322 Paper products 1.36 0.99
323 Printing and related support 0.24 0.17
324 Petroleum and coal products 1.44 1.57
325 Chemicals 1.62 1.37
326 Plastics and rubber products 0.37 0.27
327 Nonmetallic mineral products 1.86 1.39
331 Primary metals 2.06 1.62
332 Fabricated metal products 0.42 0.33
333 Machinery 0.17 0.13
334 Computer and electronic products 0.10 0.05
335 Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 0.25 0.15
336 Transportation equipment 0.13 0.11
337 Furniture and related products 0.17 0.16
339 Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.13 0.15
Total 0.64 0.49
Average wellhead price, $ per thousand cubic feet 2.95 1.96
SOURCE: U.S. Energy Information Administration (energy expenditures data) and the U.S. Department of the Census (manufacturing
shipments data).ENERGY PRICES AND THE
MACROECONOMY
Economic theory predicts that a large increase
in the relative price of energy will increase the
per-unit cost of output, thus increasing the output
(supply) price. Hence, in the standard textbook
model (for example, see Abel and Bernanke, 2005),
a rise in energy prices, in the absence of a fiscal
or monetary policy response, reduces aggregate
output and employment and raises the price level.
One rule of thumb is that a $10 per barrel rise in
oil prices will reduce real GDP by 0.4 percent
after four quarters.6 As an important energy input
in the U.S. economy, increases in natural gas
prices would be expected to have virtually the
same effect in the textbook model as a rise in
crude oil prices. Accordingly, one should expect
that the effects of an increase or decrease in natural
gas prices on economic activity would be concep-
tually similar as that for crude oil prices.
Oil Price Effects
There is much research that explores the
relationship between energy prices and economic
activity, and a reading of this literature suggests
that oil prices matter. This should probably not
be surprising given that petroleum still accounts
for 40 percent of U.S. energy usage. The prevailing
view is that increases in oil prices reduce real
GDP growth for several quarters. The size of the
effect varies, but earlier studies seem to suggest
larger effects than later studies. This could reflect
the fact that the U.S. economy has become more
energy efficient over time.7
For a recent survey, see Jones, Leiby, and
Paik (2004). Hamilton (1983), among many others,
has documented a negative and significant rela-
tion between oil price changes and future GDP
growth. Early research efforts by the Energy
Modeling Forum at Stanford University (1987),
which employed several well-known macroeco-
nomic forecasting models in use at the time, were
consistent with Hamilton’s findings. Conversely,
recent research by Barsky and Kilian (2004) sug-
gest that the causality runs in the other direction.
That is, stronger (weaker) macroeconomic growth
increases (decreases) the demand for oil and thus
the price of oil. 
Hooker (1996) found that Hamilton’s result
breaks down after 1986, a year in which, perhaps
not coincidentally, there was a sharp, unexpected
drop in oil prices. The unstable oil-macroeconomy
relation possibly reflected the fact that Hamilton
had implicitly assumed a symmetric effect of oil
shocks in his linear specification: An increase
(decrease) in oil prices reduces (raises) future GDP
growth. This specification is consistent with the
view of some transmission channels—for example,
Rasche and Tatom (1977a,b), Baily (1981), Energy
Modeling Forum (1987), and Wei (2003).8
However, the effect can be also asymmetric.
In particular, a sharp oil price change—either
increase or decrease—affects the macroeconomy
adversely for at least two reasons. First, it raises
uncertainty about future oil prices and thus causes
delays in business investment (e.g., Bernanke,
1983, and Pindyck, 1991). Similarly, Guo and
Kliesen (2005) found that oil price volatility—a
measure of uncertainty—reduced real GDP growth
and other measures of macroeconomic activity
over the period 1984-2004. Second, it induces
costly resource reallocations (e.g., Lilien, 1982,
and Hamilton, 1988). Overall, whereas an oil
price increase has a negative effect on future
GDP growth, the effect of an oil price decrease is
ambiguous. Subsequent work by Hamilton (1996
and 2003) revealed asymmetries with respect to
oil price changes and real GDP growth. 
Natural Gas Price Effects
The literature examining the relationship
between natural gas prices and macroeconomic
activity appears to be considerably more sparse.
However, because natural gas consumption in the
aggregate economy is about half as much as petro-
leum (in terms of BTU), it might be reasonable to
conclude that rising natural gas prices might have
smaller aggregate effects than do oil prices. Early
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6 See Council of Economic Advisers (2005, p. 32).
7 Energy consumption per unit of GDP (thousands of BTU per one
dollar of real GDP) declined by 41 percent from 1979 to 2004.
8 Also see Jones, Leiby, and Paik (2004) for discussion on various
transmission channels of oil shocks.work in this area appeared in a special issue of
the October 1982 Contemporary Policy Issues.
There were three papers in this issue that studied
the effects of lifting natural gas price controls (i)
on regional economic activity (Leone, 1982), (ii)
on the distribution of income between households
and suppliers (Stockfisch, 1982), and (iii) on infla-
tion (Ott and Tatom, 1982a). The general conclu-
sion of the papers was that the presumed effects
of natural gas decontrol (higher prices, higher
inflation, and falling real incomes) were not
expected to be significant. According to the Energy
Modeling Forum (1987), a 10 percent increase in
natural gas prices was found to have roughly the
same effect on real GDP growth (two years after
the shock) as a 20 percent increase in oil prices.
According to the median result of 11 models, a
50 percent oil shock reduced real gross national
product by about 1.5 percent after one year and by
a little less than 3 percent by the end of two years.9
At the disaggregated level, Cullen, Friedberg, and
Wolfram (2005) studied the effects of anticipated
and unanticipated shocks to household dispos-
able income arising from increased energy expen-
ditures on household consumption. They found
that increases in energy prices reduce consump-
tion among lower-income households, but only
when the increase is unanticipated.
More recently, the Energy Modeling Forum
at Stanford University hosted a conference in
December 2005: “World Natural Gas Markets and
Trade.” According to an Economics and Statistics
Administration (2005) study prepared for the U.S.
Congress, a permanent $1 increase in natural gas
prices (wellhead price) over the period 2000-04
reduced real GDP growth by 0.1 percentage points
per year.10 Studies by Global Insight and Oxford
Economics Forecasting were cited as showing
similar results.
However, because some manufacturing indus-
tries are more natural gas–intensive than others, it
is possible that the disaggregated effects are more
significant. The next section examines this issue.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This analysis will test whether higher natural
gas prices predict the growth of U.S. manufactur-
ing output and real GDP: Aggregate manufacturing
output will be measured using the manufacturing
component of the industrial production (IP) index;
the disaggregated measures are IP output at the
three-digit NAICS level for all manufacturing
industries.11 The IP indices are published monthly
by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The
natural gas price data series used in the empirical
analysis is the producer price index (PPI) for nat-
ural gas, which is a commodity index published
monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. One
potential shortcoming of this approach is that
natural gas prices paid can vary significantly
across industries. For example, the 2002 MECS
found that the average price paid by three-digit
NAICS industries varied between $3.37 and $5.47
per million BTU; the standard deviation was $0.57
per million BTU. Although the use of price-hedging
arrangements such as fixed-price or futures mar-
kets contracts may allow some firms to pay less
on average than other firms, it seems reasonable
to conclude that, eventually, all firms must bear
price increases or decreases based on market
trends.
The empirical analysis will follow the general
form of a simple least-squares regression:
(1)
where at is a constant, Xt is output, and Pt is the
PPI measure of natural gas prices. The maximum
lag length is set to 12 for the monthly analysis and
4 for the quarterly analysis, and the optimum lag
length is determined by using the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC) statistic. The sample period
begins in January 1979, which immediately fol-
∆= + ∆ + ∆     −−
=




   +ε t,
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9 Using a general-equilibrium framework, Guerrieri (2005) found
that a 50 percent permanent increase in the price of oil reduced
U.S. real GDP growth by 0.6 percent after one year and 1.9 percent
after two years (relative to the baseline forecast).
10 The study used an interindustry model of the U.S. economy
developed at the University of Maryland (INFORUM LIFT);
www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/projects/emf23/Henry.pdf.
11 Total industrial production also includes output produced by
mines and utilities. Thus, the analysis presented in this paper
excludes the effects of higher natural gas prices on these sectors.lows the commencement of U.S. natural gas dereg-
ulation, and extends through February 2006. 
The results are reported in Table 4.12 Each
row reports the results of separate regressions for
total manufacturing output and industry output
at the three-digit NAICS level. Following Hamilton
(2003), the table regresses contemporaneous out-
put growth (log change) on an equal number of
its lags and lags in the log change in natural gas
prices. As Hamilton showed, even though the
individual coefficients of the lagged energy prices
may not be significantly different from zero, col-
lectively they may be significantly different from
Kliesen
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Table 4
Do Changes in Natural Gas Prices Affect the Industrial Sector?
IP sector Lags (AIC) Sum of ci coefficient p-Value
Manufacturing 3 0.0033 0.862
Food 1 0.0013 0.709
Beverages and tobacco products 2 0.0232 0.419
Textile mills 12 –0.0499 0.416
Textile product mills 9 –0.0381 0.844
Apparel 4 0.0276 0.284
Leather and allied products 4 0.0379 0.255
Wood products 1 –0.0031 0.791
Paper products 3 –0.0091 0.791
Printing and related support activities 4 0.0062 0.920
Petroleum and coal products 2 –0.0063 0.256
Chemicals 1 –0.0033 0.519
Plastics and rubber products 1 –0.0030 0.612
Nonmetallic mineral products 3 0.0186 0.192
Primary metals 2 –0.0170 0.614
Fabricated metal products 3 –0.0007 0.800
Machinery 6 –0.0254 0.148
Computers and electrical products 6 –0.0158 0.371
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 12 –0.0372 0.841
Transportation equipment 1 –0.0063 0.61
Furniture and related products 2 –0.0155* 0.077
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 –0.0031 0.742
NOTE: The table reports the general form of the model that was run over the period January 1979 to February 2006:
IP is industrial production (total and individual industry), and PPI_NatGas is the producer price index for gas fuels. The p-values are
from the test of the null that all of the lags of PPI_NatGas are equal to zero. The optimum lag length chosen by the AIC statistic. For
the reported p-values, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.





    + ∑
1
12 In results not reported here, the growth of U.S. manufacturing
output (log change) was regressed on a constant, the growth (log
change) in natural gas prices, and its coefficient was positive and
not significantly different from zero. In fact, the adjusted R2 of the
equation was negative. This regression was subsequently augmented
(i) with last period’s output growth and (ii) by cyclical changes in 
economic activity, as measured by the unemployment rate. The
adjusted R2 of the final specification was only about 20 percent.
For brevity, the results are not published here, but are available
from the author.zero.13 As indicated by the p-value, a simple F-test
is used to determine whether the sum of the coef-
ficients on the natural gas prices is significantly
different from zero.
The results in Table 4 are revealing. First,
changes in natural gas prices do not significantly
predict total manufacturing output. Although the
sum of the coefficients in the aggregate regression
is positive, it is not significantly different from
zero. Second, regressions at the three-digit NAICS
level reveal that the furniture and related products
sector is the only industry where changes in nat-
ural gas prices help to predict output growth. In
this case, the sum of the coefficients is negative,
as expected, and significant at the 10 percent level.
The other regressions in Table 4 suggest that
changes in natural gas prices do not help to pre-
dict output growth for the remaining industries.
In fact, the sum of the coefficients for 6 of the 21
industries is positive, with 12 of the industries
reporting p-values greater than 0.5. 
Using An Alternative Measure of
Natural Gas Prices
Hamilton (2003) showed that an asymmetric
measure of oil prices helps explain real GDP
growth. To test whether there are similar asym-
metries with respect to natural gas prices, this
article constructs two transformations of monthly
natural gas prices that are consistent with his
findings. The first is the percentage difference in
the maximum price (log) over the most recent 12
months. The second uses a 36-month interval. If
the percentage difference is negative, that month’s
observation is arbitrarily set to zero. Thus, in the
Hamilton framework, only energy price increases
matter; energy price decreases do not matter.
Figure 3 plots the transformation for crude oil
and natural gas prices for the 36-month interval.
The figure shows that price increases for crude
oil tend to be larger before 1990, while natural
gas price increases tend to be larger after 1990.
Tables 5 and 6 attempt to assess whether
Hamilton’s transformations for natural gas and
crude oil prices help to explain growth of manu-
facturing output at the aggregate and disaggregated
level. Table 5 uses Hamilton’s price changes over
Kliesen
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13 This amounts to running a constrained and unconstrained regres-















Hamilton Transformations of Petroleum and Natural Gas Prices (36 months)
NOTE: Shaded bars indicate recessions.Kliesen
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Table 5
Do Increases in Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Prices Affect Manufacturing Activity? 
A Test Using Hamilton’s 12-Month Specification
Crude petroleum Natural gas
Sum of ci Sum of ci
IP sector Lags (AIC)† coefficient p-Value Lags (AIC)† coefficient p-Value
Manufacturing 3 –0.0206 0.535 4 –0.0099 0.555
Food 1 0.0150 0.190 1 0.0027 0.707
Beverages and tobacco products 7 0.0348 0.113 2 0.0070 0.803
Textile mills 12 –0.1079 0.176 12 –0.0592** 0.035
Textile product mills 4 –0.1498* 0.057 9 –0.0583 0.336
Apparel 4 0.0000 0.656 5 –0.0427 0.149
Leather and allied products 6 –0.0017 0.114 7 –0.0849 0.172
Wood products 10 –0.2520** 0.040 7 –0.0319 0.945
Paper products 3 –0.0147 0.554 6 –0.0787** 0.027
Printing and related activities 4 –0.0312 0.276 4 –0.0263 0.631
Petroleum and coal products 2 –0.0946*** 0.010 2 –0.0103 0.261
Chemicals 1 –0.0109 0.501 1 0.0002 0.987
Plastics and rubber products 1 –0.0281 0.133 1 –0.0146 0.217
Nonmetallic mineral products 5 –0.1034*** 0.008 3 0.0171 0.252
Primary metals 2 –0.0522 0.601 2 –0.0283 0.514
Fabricated metal products 3 –0.0249* 0.051 3 –0.0137 0.656
Machinery 3 –0.009 0.772 3 –0.0256 0.324
Computer and electrical products 6 –0.0077 0.958 6 –0.0358 0.167
Electrical equipment, appliances,  12 –0.0499 0.877 12 –0.0639 0.490
and components
Transportation equipment 1 –0.0698* 0.080 1 –0.0307 0.222
Furniture and related products 3 –0.0574 0.121 2 –0.0231 0.228
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 –0.0132 0.716 3 –0.0188 0.182
NOTE: The table reports the general form of the two regressions (for the separate energy price series) that were run over the period
January 1979 to February 2006:
IP is industrial production (total and individual industry), and H1.PPI_Energy is the producer price index for natural gas and domestic
crude petroleum production transformed according to Hamilton (2003); the transformation period is 12 months. The p-values are from
the test of the null that all of the lags of H1.PPI_NatGas are equal to zero. For the reported p-values, ***, **, and * denote significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. †The optimum lag length was chosen by the AIC statistic.
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Table 6
Do Increases in Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Prices Affect Manufacturing Activity? 
A Test Using Hamilton’s 36-Month Specification
Crude petroleum Natural gas
Sum of ci Sum of ci
IP sector Lags (AIC)† coefficient p-Value Lags (AIC)† coefficient p-Value
Manufacturing 4 –0.0444 0.125 4 –0.0186 0.365
Food 1 0.0086 0.509 1 0.0000 0.996
Beverages and tobacco products 6 –0.0470 0.151 4 –0.0802** 0.033
Textile mills 2 –0.0532 0.151 12 –0.0426** 0.033
Textile product mills 4 –0.1869** 0.016 9 –0.1159 0.434
Apparel 4 0.0088 0.403 4 –0.020 0.651
Leather and allied products 6 –0.0070 0.120 7 –0.1143** 0.013
Wood products 10 –0.3299** 0.021 7 –0.0639 0.631
Paper and products 3 –0.0115 0.659 10 –0.0623* 0.097
Printing and related support  8 –0.0452 0.358 4 –0.0172 0.610
Petroleum and coal products 2 –0.1157*** 0.004 2 –0.002 0.342
Chemicals 1 –0.0157 0.395 1 0.0049 0.713
Plastics and rubber products 1 –0.0343 0.105 1 –0.0144 0.342
Nonmetallic mineral products 5 –0.1478*** 0.002 3 0.0091 0.674
Primary metals 2 –0.0534 0.678 2 –0.0438 0.481
Fabricated metal products 5 –0.0681*** 0.003 3 –0.0157 0.608
Machinery 6 –0.0637 0.365 6 –0.0944** 0.022
Computers and electrical products 6 –0.0360 0.725 6 –0.0773** 0.016
Electrical equipment, appliances,  12 –0.0883 0.412 12 –0.1101 0.309
and components
Transportation equipment 1 –0.0892** 0.048 1 –0.0181 0.573
Furniture and related products 9 –0.1564*** 0.003 2 –0.0296 0.263
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 –0.0294 0.328 3 –0.0292** 0.049
NOTE: The table reports the general form of the two regressions (for the separate energy price series) that were run over the period
January 1979 to February 2006:
IP is industrial production (total and individual industry) and H3.PPI_Energy is the producer price index for natural gas and domestic
crude petroleum production transformed according to Hamilton (2003); the transformation period is 36 months. The p-values are from
the test of the null that all of the lags of H3.PPI_NatGas are equal to zero. For the reported p-values, ***, **, and * denote significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. †The optimum lag length was chosen by the AIC statistic.







    + ∑a 12-month period, and Table 6 uses price changes
over a 36-month period. The latter corresponds
with the 3-year period that Hamilton used in his
2003 article. As in Table 4, Tables 5 and 6 report
the number of significant lags of the natural gas
variable based on the AIC criteria, as well as the
sum of the coefficients of the lags. The tables also
report the p-values for the lags at the conventional
1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance.
Switching to the Hamilton transformation
for natural gas prices produces results that are
broadly consistent with the theory noted above.
Table 5 shows that, for total manufacturing output,
the sum of the lagged coefficients on gas prices
is negative (first line); however, they are still not
significantly different from zero (p-value of 0.56).
This result is essentially the same for crude oil
prices. Table 5 also shows that when Hamilton’s
12-month specification is used, the number of
industries where increases in gas prices signifi-
cantly predict industry output growth increases
from one to two: textile mills and paper products.
In both cases, the effects of higher gas prices
linger from 6 to 12 months. Perhaps of greater
interest, Table 5 also shows that there are six
manufacturing industries that are significantly
affected by changes in crude oil prices—three
times the number that are affected by increases
in natural gas prices. The sum of the coefficients
on each of these industries is the expected sign. 
Table 6 is an extension of Table 5. In this case,
results are reported using the 36-month specifi-
cation. In this specification, changes in natural
gas prices have a negative effect on the growth of
manufacturing output (line 1), but the p-value is
still insignificant (0.37). Unlike Table 5, which
showed comparable results for increases in oil
and gas prices on total manufacturing output, the
first line of Table 6 shows that the sum of the
coefficients on crude oil prices (–0.044) is more
than twice as large as that for natural gas prices
(–0.019), but the p-value for crude oil is not signifi-
cant. Another interesting difference between the
results in Tables 5 and 6 is that the number of
industries that are significantly affected by changes
in natural gas prices increases from two to seven.
As before, the sum of the coefficients is still nega-
tive. Combined, these seven industries comprise
about a quarter of manufacturing’s total weight
in IP (reported in Table 2). Also of interest, higher
gas prices do not significantly help predict output
growth in the three industries where expenditures
on natural gas were the largest percentage of total
industry shipments: primary metals, nonmetallic
mineral products, and chemicals (see Table 3).
This might explain why the aggregate effect (line 1)
is not significant. As an aside, the finding for the
chemical industry is particularly interesting, since
it is by far the largest user of natural gas (see
Table 2).
Finally, Table 6 shows that increases in crude
oil prices have similar predictive effects on out-
put when the Hamilton specification is extended
to 36 months. In this case, the number of indus-
tries where increases in crude oil prices signifi-
cantly predict output increases from six to seven.
Again, the sum of the coefficients in each case
has the expected negative sign. As with the seven
industries in the previous paragraph, these seven
industries also combine to comprise about a quar-
ter of manufacturing’s weight in IP.
Extending the Analysis to the Aggregate
Level
The basic conclusion of the results presented
in Tables 5 and 6 is that crude oil prices seem to
have a more significant predictive effect for manu-
facturing industry output growth using Hamilton’s
12-month specification, but essentially compara-
ble effects when the specification is extended to
36 months. Table 7 reports an extended version
of Hamilton’s findings to assess whether this find-
ing holds for real GDP. Hamilton (2003) found that
the explanatory power of his 3-year specification
for oil price increases was much more significant
than the 1-year specification in explaining real
GDP growth.14 Using data from the first quarter
of 1979 through the fourth quarter of 2005, Table
7 shows that this is still the case: The p-value using
Hamilton’s 12-quarter specification is significant,
Kliesen
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14 Hamilton’s results are based on data that begin in 1948, a much
longer time series than reported here. As in Hamilton’s work,
Table 7 uses four lags and it adopts Hamilton’s convention of using
the log change in quarterly real GDP (not annualized).but it is not significant for the 4-quarter 
transformation. 
Table 7 also reports tests of whether changes
in natural gas prices predict real GDP growth.
The evidence presented in the table suggests that
that is not the case. Unlike increases in crude oil
prices, increases in natural gas prices do not sig-
nificantly predict real GDP growth using either
of Hamilton’s specifications. These results are
generally consistent with the total manufacturing
results reported earlier. 
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the disruptions caused by
hurricanes Katrina and Rita, natural gas prices
faced by consumers and producers rose to record-
high levels. Because natural gas is the second
most important energy source for the economy,
there was widespread concern that these high
prices might cause a significant slowing in the
economy and among those manufacturing indus-
tries that depend heavily on natural gas as a source
of energy. The analysis presented in this article
offers some support for the latter contention, but
only when prices are transformed according to
the specification suggested by Hamilton. However,
the results using Hamilton’s specifications indi-
cate that changes in natural gas prices do not cause
significant output effects for the two manufacturers
that are the most-intensive users of natural gas
(primary metals and nonmetallic mineral prod-
ucts), although they do cause significant output
effects for other, less-intensive manufacturers
(such as machinery and computers and electrical
products). While perhaps significant, this result
must be balanced against the finding that, when
the analysis is extended to the macroeconomy
(real GDP), increases in crude oil prices signifi-
cantly predict real GDP growth, but natural gas
prices do not.
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